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We all need help finding our way around the American administrative state.
An important guidebook has now arrived. The publication of Cass Sunstein's
After the Rights Revolution is a significant event for those interested in admin-
istrative law and regulation, as well as for those concerned with the theory of
legal interpretation.
The book has two primary aims. First, Professor Sunstein identifies the
different types of regulation and develops a theoretical defense for government
regulation based on fifty years of post-New Deal history. Second, he exhausti-
vely describes various approaches to statutory interpretation, criticizing those
based on misguided assumptions about regulation. Through this analysis,
Sunstein endeavors to bring interpretive practice into line with regulatory
experience by offering a collection of "background norms" that courts should
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use to interpret statutes-norms that he suggests will improve the operation of
regulatory statutes.
Sunstein uses the book's historical perspective to engage and criticize the
work of eminent, but now-departed, members of the legal community. He
repeatedly challenges the views of Karl Llewellyn, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Henry Hart, and others on questions of regulation and interpretation. These
scholars might appreciate an opportunity to reply. What follows is a glimpse
at some of the letters we might imagine are circulating among this invisible
host of readers in response to Sunstein's book. The letters contain the reactions
of a jurist (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.),' a legal scholar (Karl Llewellyn),'
and a political theorist (Hannah Arendt)3 to this work.4
Llewellyn's letters suggest that Sunstein, while writing a book about
statutes, unconsciously mimics the common law perspective of an appellate
court.5 Llewellyn remains uncertain how Sunstein's principles for interpreting
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was born in Boston in 1841. After service in the Civil War, he graduated
from Harvard Law School in 1866 and entered private practice. After a brief time as a law professor at
Harvard, Holmes served on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1882 to 1902. (Sunstein later
served as a law clerk for Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the same court, who delivered the Holmes lectures
at Harvard Law School.) Holmes moved on to be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1902,
and remained on the bench until 1932. S. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 379-82 (1989). See Kaplan, Encounters with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L. REV. 1828 (1983).
Holmes is an ubiquitous figure in American jurisprudence. Many of his judicial opinions remain staples
of legal education. His studies of the common law tradition, contained in The Common Law and a collection
of law review articles, express many ideas fundamental to jurisprudence in this century. It is no accident,
therefore, that Sunstein refers several times to Holmes in this book about regulation and statutes. See pp.
113, 121, 126, 263, 265. To understand Holmes' likely positions on these matters is, in large part, to
understand the changes in American public law in this century.
2. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn was born in Seattle in 1893 and attended secondary school in
Mecklenburg, Germany. Llewellyn graduated from Yale Law School in 1918. He taught at Columbia Law
School from 1924 to 1951, and at the University of Chicago Law School from 1951 until his death in 1962.
He was the leading figure in the Legal Realist movement in American legal theory; he pioneered efforts
to explore connections between law and sociology and economics; and he had a formative influence on the
Uniform Commercial Code and commercial law generally. Llewellyn visited at the University of Leipzig,
and was a fluent speaker and writer of German. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 87-113 (1973).
3. Hannah Arendt was born in 1906 in Hannover, Germany. She did graduate work in philosophy with
Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. She fled Germany in 1933 for Paris to escape the Nazis and later
emigrated to the United States, where she wrote THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951), the work that
established her reputation as a political theorist. Arendt taught at a number of institutions, including
Princeton University, University of California at Berkeley, Brooklyn College, the New School for Social
Research, and the University of Chicago. She lectured at the University of Chicago in 1956 and early in
1962, at the end of the German-speaking Llewellyn's career at Chicago. E. YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH
ARENDT. FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD (1982) (detailing Arendt's nomadic academic career). Professor Sunstein
now teaches at the University of Chicago.
4. Annotations are provided to clarify the intent of the letter-writers. I make no sustained effort to
replicate the writing style of each correspondent, apart from characteristic salutations and closings. However,
I do attempt to represent their likely reactions to Sunstein's arguments.
5. Llewellyn devoted many years to the study and description of the activity of common law courts.
His increasingly complex set of views regarding the common law system appear in K. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (tentative ed. 1930) [hereinafter BRAMBLE BUSH]; K.
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (1989)(written in Germany in the early 1930's) (first
published in German in 1933 and translated into English in 1989) [hereinafter CASE LAW SYSTEM]; K.
LLEWELLYN, THIE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS (1960) [hereinafter COMMON LAW].
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vague statutory language would operate in future cases, concluding that
Sunstein's approach, like the common law method, is more helpful in synthesiz-
ing the past than in facing the future. Holmes builds on Llewellyn's observa-
tions by arguing that Sunstein does not take proper care to explore the different
contributions that Congress, the courts, and the executive branch make to the
interpretive enterprise.
Arendt, setting aside all issues concerning interpretation and institutional
roles, takes issue with Sunstein's defense of regulation. Arendt commends
Sunstein for his attempt to create a realm for politics that transcends individual
interests, but criticizes his incomplete vision of regulation. She claims that,
while he offers a number of reasons for government to regulate, he offers no
method to judge whether various types of collective action will promote or
extinguish freedom.
While each of the correspondents criticizes Sunstein for the pivotal ques-
tions he leaves unaddressed, all of them clearly admire After the Rights Revolu-
tion. Each writer has witnessed the tremendous changes in government in this
century traced by Sunstein.
Llewellyn to Arendt
Dear Professor Arendt,
I would like to suggest that we read for our next afternoon book discussion
the recent effort by Cass Sunstein, the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurispru-
dence at our old stomping ground in Chicago. To whet your appetite, I will try
my hand at reconstructing his argument here, withholding my criticisms until
later.
Sunstein prefaces his argument by quoting me: "Technique without morals
is a menace; but morals without technique is a mess."'6 He explores both
morality and technique (although more of the latter) by tracing "the rise of
social and economic regulation" and its relationship to American constitutional
government and statutory interpretation.7
Sunstein begins with a history of regulation in America, drawing on his
earlier work8 and focusing first on James Madison's republic. In his account,
Madison designed a powerful national government because he was convinced
that representatives in a larger republic could better insulate themselves from
6. P. xi.
7. Pp. 1, 4, 9-10.
8. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) [hereinafter New
Deal; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Interest
Groups]; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter
Naked Preferences].
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the pressure of "factions," or interest groups.9 National representatives would
then be free to engage in the deliberative task of politics.10 Because of the
ever-present danger of factions, moreover, Madison linked this "deliberative"
vision of representation to a limited government that preserved a broad arena
for private ordering.'
Several of the fundamental features of the constitutional structure, including
checks and balances and federalism, reflected this effort to limit the realm of
government and the effects of faction in government.12 During the early life
of the Republic, the courts maintained limits on governmental activity through
common law principles, which gradually "came to be treated as largely neutral
and prepolitical." 3
The New Deal transformed these original constitutional arrangements in two
respects. 4 First, it called into question all forms of common law ordering.
Common law entitlements came to be viewed not as a neutral condition pro-
duced through government inaction, but as a product of political choices sus-
tained by government action.15 New Dealers found the common law inade-
quate because it failed to protect the disadvantaged and prevented the govern-
ment from stabilizing the economy. Second, the New Deal shifted power from
state governments and the state and federal judiciary to the federal executive.16
The federal bureaucracy expanded at a remarkable rate. Separation of powers
principles gave way to accommodate an "autonomous" administration thought
necessary to respond to the complex responsibilities of modern government.
Sunstein points to the "Rights Revolution" of the 1960's and 70's as the
final milestone in the history of the regulatory state. During this time, Congress
and the President took bold regulatory initiatives in areas such as discrimination
9. Factions in a larger republic "would be so numerous that they would cancel each other out." Pp.
14-15; see also Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 40-42.
10. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.L 1539, 1558-64 (1988) (elaborating
Madisonian vision of representation). Although sharing some common ground with republicanism, such as
a belief in a politics that transcends individual interests, Madison's ideal of representation departs from
republican thought in important ways. It downplays citizen participation in government and discounts the
importance of education and civic virtue among citizens. Pp. 14-15; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note
8, at 38-42.
11. Sunstein makes an important qualification, however. The Constitution's attempt to protect life,
liberty, and property required the government to "protect citizens from private aggression by the provision
and indeed redistribution of security," and therefore went beyond a negative view of government. P. 17.
Sunstein does not elaborate on the implications of this view for the various state action requirements in the
Constitution.
12. The system of checks and balances (including judicial review) and federalism were both means
to divide governmental power and "diminish the risk of tyranny." P. 16. The individual rights stressed in
the original document were private property rights. The contracts clause, privileges and immunities clause,
and eminent domain clause served similar purposes. Pp. 16-17.
13. P. 18.
14. See also B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (describing transformation of
legal practice and theory during New Deal).
15. P. 19; Sunstein, The Beard Thesis and Franklin Roosevelt, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120-21
(1987).
16. Pp. 22-24; Sunstein, New Deal, supra note 8, at 440-46.
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(with the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and health and safety risks (with the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1977, and
others).,7 All three branches of the federal government abandoned the New
Deal faith in administrative autonomy, because autonomy apparently produced
"captured" agencies. The Rights Revolution ended in the 1980's, as economic
difficulties created a willingness to deregulate certain sectors of the econo-
my. 18
Sunstein moves next to his theoretical defense of regulation. 9 He sees the
primary challenge to regulation coming from those who argue for minimal
government based on notions of liberty: because individuals know their prefer-
ences, their choices should remain untouched whenever they do no harm to
others. ° Sunstein counters with several answers, which I have rearranged
somewhat. Each is a more comprehensive critique than the last, and each
suggests that regulation can increase social welfare and autonomy.
The first, and most modest, answer to opponents of regulation emphasizes
the difficulties of coordinating individual choices and attempts to correct market
failure. That is, regulation overcomes the failure of a market to satisfy people's
preferences where they need to act together. For instance, regulation of a public
good, such as national defense, provides collective protection. Without coercion,
nobody would pay for their preferences, hoping instead that others would pay.
Regulation perfects the market by helping persons satisfy their existing prefer-
ences, without making others worse off.2'
A second level of response, which I call the "aspirational" strategy, recog-
nizes that people have complicated preferences. They may act in one way, yet
aspire to act differently. A person's behavior as a market actor might diverge
from her aspirations as a voter or citizen: she could choose to watch only
situation comedies on television and yet prefer that more diverse programs
remain available.22 Similarly, a person may choose to commit himself early
to a particular course of action, attempting to prevent a shortsighted choice at
some later time.23 Regulation can translate aspirations such as these into action
where the market would not do so.
The most comprehensive answer, which I call the "preference formation"
strategy, goes beyond the market's failure to translate existing desires into
17. Pp. 24-31 (listing statutes).
18. P. 31; see also McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 253, 260-68
(1986) (detailing the regulatory reform movement of the 1970's and 1980's); Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1315-19 (1986).
19. Pp. 32-46.
20. Pp. 35-38; see generally R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRiVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985) (exploring constitutional and philosophical bases for libertarianism).
21. Pp. 34-35, 48-55. This regulatory strategy allows for Pareto-optimal improvements in wel-
fare-which make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off-and therefore avoids
the difficulty of making interpersonal comparisons of utility.
22. Pp. 38-39, 57-60.
23. Pp. 57-60, 67-69.
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public policy. In this view, regulation not only helps persons attain their prefer-
ences, but also helps improve the process of forming preferences. 24 Preferences
are questionable when they are based on inadequate information or on opportu-
nities limited by current legal rules, such as opportunities for interaction
between racial groups under laws tolerating segregation. 2 Hence, regulation
might provide better information to those forming preferences, or it might
promote diversity of experience to enable people to scrutinize critically their
current preferences and perhaps form new ones.27
Sunstein translates this theoretical case for regulation into a more detailed
taxonomy of the purposes of regulatory statutes. He creates categories of
purposes as a reminder that we must evaluate each regulatory scheme on its
own terms, since different programs have different aims. Sunstein lists eight
purposes for regulation:' (1) remedying market failure, (2) redistributing
wealth, (3) carrying out collective desires and precommitment strategies, (4)
creating diversity of experience and opportunities for preference formation,29
(5) ending social subordination, (6) surmounting preferences endogenous to the
legal and social order,30 (7) protecting future generations from irreversible
decisions, and (8) transferring income to interest groups.3 1
This list, it seems to me, is a bit unwieldy, for any given regulatory statute
might serve several of these purposes. This is true, not only because statutes
have multiple objectives, but also because the classifications themselves contain
overlapping categories. 32 The overlapping quality is troubling because Sunstein
uses the categories to distinguish different forms of regulation, invoking
different criteria to evaluate different categories of regulation. In addition, some
categories present complex rationales for regulation because they combine the
three regulatory strategies already described: coordinating preferences, following
complex preferences, and shaping preferences. For instance, regulation attempt-
ing to eliminate social subordination seeks to reshape the preference for dis-
crimination33 and further the aspirations of those who wish to eliminate race
24. Pp. 34-35, 41-42; Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CIIL L. REV. 1129
(1986).
25. Pp. 61-64.
26. Pp. 52-53, 67.
27. Pp. 60-61.
28. Pp. 47-73 (Ch. 2, "The Functions of Regulatory Statutes").
29. This rationale for regulation applies when private choices push toward homogeneity. This problem
may require some regulation to promote diversity and to encourage the formation of different preferences.
Pp. 60-61.
30. This category includes a variety ofregulations in instances where preferences are a function of legal
rules or existing practices. Pp. 64-67.
31. This is, of course, an unjustified aim of regulation. Sunstein argues that this category only applies
to regulation that does not plausibly fall within any other regulatory purpose. Pp. 69-7 1.
32. For instance, Sunstein discusses separately "interest-group transfers" and "redistributive" statutes.
See pp. 61-64, 66-67 (antidiscrimination laws discussed under two headings); pp. 52-53, 67 (inadequate
information discussed under multiple headings).
33. Such measures recognize that private choices will perpetuate discrimination because people learn
to adapt to existing injustice; for instance, both beneficiaries and victims of discrimination may tend to
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or gender bias, but who fear reprisals from others in the marketplace for doing
The argument up to this point left me convinced that there are many reasons
to regulate. Sunstein also provides, however, an equally dizzying set of reasons
not to regulate .3  Either at the time of design or at the time of implementation,
government actors may ignore or forget two likely sources of regulatory failure:
(1) preferences blocked by regulation will likely reappear in other, more
destructive forms, and (2) regulators have incentives to favor some private
interests over others (the "capture" argument). These forces frequently produce
"paradoxes of regulation," which "bring about results precisely opposite to
those that are intended. 36
Regulatory failures are commonly the result of interest-group influence, as
occurred, for example, when producers of dirty, high-sulphur coal convinced
Congress to pursue an antipollution strategy that disadvantaged the clean-coal
producers.37 Sunstein indicts regulatory statutes for failing to remain flexible
about the best means to a desired outcome. The use of an uncompromising
rhetoric of "rights" contributes to this lack of flexibility.3
In Sunstein's view, the Framers of the Constitution created a structure that
responds well to many possible regulatory failures. The potential problem of
interest group dominance was addressed by a system of checks and balances.39
The effort to ensure both deliberation and accountability in government also
improves many regulatory schemes.4 According to Sunstein, federalism allows
different states the flexibility necessary to respond to differing conditions
"blame the victim." Antidiscrimination laws attempt to change these attitudes. Pp. 61-64, 66-67.
34. Another category of regulation that combines the three strategies is labeled 'Irreversibility, Future
generations, Animals, and Nature." Pp. 67-69. Some choices may be sensible for an individual making a
choice today, but their consequences (such as environmental degradation) will be felt by others in the future
and will be difficult to reverse. Regulation in this setting responds to an externality, costs falling on those
not responsible for the decision. Pp. 54-55. It also might seek to change preferences formed with inadequate
information, or to carry out aspirations of protecting the interests of future generations or other species.
35. See pp. 74-110 (Ch. 3, "How Regulation Fails").
36. P. 74; see also Sunstein, Paradoxes oftheRegulatory State, 57 U. CHu. L. REV. 407,412-13 (1990).
37. P. 85; see also B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR 26-58 (1981); see Macey,
Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY
L.L 1, 17-21 (1984) (arguing banking legislation resulted from conflict between commercial and investment
bankers).
38. Pp. 89-91. Statutes may fail to account for side-effects of regulation, or they may use a regulatory
tool that is mismatched to the regulatory problem. Pp. 88-89, 91-94; see also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND
ITS REFORM 191-96 (1982). The factual assumptions regarding some regulatory statutes, such as banking
or telecommunications laws, may be undermined by technological or social changes. Pp. 94-96. Even if
a statute passes through this steeplechase of possible failures, the regulatory agency might implement it
poorly. The agency might seek to increase its own power and prestige, by responding to the most powerful
political group that approaches it with a request, or simply by pursuing an agenda inconsistent with the
statute. Pp. 97-102. But see Jaffe, The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L. 1068, 1073
(1956) (attributing most regulatory failure to statutory design). By contrast, the agency might also hesitate
to act without complete information, even though information is never complete. P. 98.
39. Pp. 107-09; see also Sunstein, New Deal, supra note 8, at 452-500; Sunstein, Naked Preferences,
supra note 8, at 1691-92. Sunstein posits checks and balances as a mechanism for controlling factional
influence in creating statutes, but not at the level of implementation.
40. Pp. 101-02, 187.
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throughout the country." The unitary executive envisioned by the Constitution
would give the President power to coordinate policy and promote accountabili-
ty.42 Restoring these constitutional understandings to the status they lost during
the New Deal would, in his view, help prevent regulatory failure.43
The final half of the book deals with the contribution of courts to a success-
ful regulatory program." In particular, Sunstein outlines an approach to inter-
preting statutes, which requires that the courts "sympathetic[ally] engage"45
the statute and draw upon "background" understandings that recognize the
typical failures of regulation.4
Sunstein stakes out his own theory of statutory interpretation through a
process of elimination, attempting to catalog and avoid the shortcomings of
other approaches. He begins with the various "agency" theories, which view
courts as agents carrying out the will of the legislature.47 Sunstein finds each
such approach to be inadequate. An interpreter, he says, must derive the
meaning of words from background understandings drawn from the cultural
context." Usually the norms are widely shared and noncontroversial, but at
times the choice of norms will be highly controversial. The need for back-
ground norms will be most striking where a statute is silent, addresses a
situation ambiguously, or delegates lawmaking power to the courts.49 The need
will also be present where the statute seems to be overinclusive, underinclusive,
41. Pp. 102, 108-09; see also Sunstein, New Deal, supra note 8, at 501-08.
42. Pp. 107-08; see also Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal
Rulemaking, 38 ADMN. L REV. 181, 197-202 (1986).
43. Sunstein closes Chapter 3 by tying various regulatory failures to the seven forms of regulation they
afflict most often. For instance, statutes that "promote public-spirited redistribution" often have a "weak
understanding of the ways in which regulation interacts with the market." P. 103. Statutes that "respond
to a short-term public outcry" tend to interfere excessively in the market. P. 105. Finally, regulatory statutes
"fail quite generally as a result of the absence of political accountability or political deliberation, changed
circumstances or obsolescence, a misunderstanding of systemic effects, and lack of coordination." P. 105.
He cautions that "[all of these generalizations are of course subject to exceptions." P. 105.
44. The Harvard Law Review published a revised version of the manuscript of these three chapters
in December 1989, several months before publication of the book. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L REV. 405 (1989).
45. P. 73.
46. Pp. 111-12.
47. One manifestation of the agency view is "textualism," which calls on courts to give meaning to
the statutory text without reference to any "outside" sources such as current conditions or the statute's
history or larger purposes. Pp. 113-22. Other agency theories include the structural approach, which resolves
interpretive difficulties by choosing the meaning that creates the best fit among various statutory provisions,
pp. 122-23, and the purposive approach, which looks to the legislature's underlying intent regarding the
matter at hand. Pp. 123-33.
The agency approach, in Sunstein's view, contains an important truth: it recognizes the democratic
pedigree of the legislature and, particularly, of the statutory language it chooses. The legislature enacts
words, not a history or an intent. Cf. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671 (1990);
Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 338-58 (1985); Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L REV. 863, 871-72 (1930).
48. Pp. 135-37; see also Aleinikoff, UpdatingStatutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 20,33(1988).
49. Pp. 116-18, 124. Ambiguities in the legislature's meaning are especially likely to occur where the
court looks beyond the text to ascertain the underlying "intenf' of a collective body. Legislators are likely
to have multiple purposes that cannot be aggregated into a single legislative intent. Pp. 124-28; see also
Radin, supra note 47, at 869-71.
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or outdated, and therefore produces absurd results.5" Where the statutory lan-
guage does not clearly resolve the issue, no constitutional consideration prevents
a court from reaching an alternative, arguably better, rule based on background
understandings.51
An interpretive theory one step removed from the agency theories looks to
the overriding "purpose" of the legislation, rather than to the legislative intent
on a specific issue. Sunstein places me in this category, along with Ronald
Dworkin, and Legal Process scholars Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. 52 Each
of us has urged courts to seek out the most sensible purpose of the statute, and
to construe it in a way that best furthers that purpose.53 Sunstein, however,
finds that advice too open-ended in a society where there is likely to be conflict
over what is "reasonable" or most "sensible."' ' While I take issue with this
criticism, I will press ahead with Sunstein's argument for now.
Several interpretive theories rely on extratextual norms that are more
specific than "reasonableness," but Sunstein finds them wanting for other
reasons. Under the public choice theory, statutes are nothing more than incoher-
ent compromises or "deals" between interest groups and legislators. The role
of the courts therefore is simply to enforce legislative deals rather than to
fathom the "purpose" of a compromise outcome.55 While Sunstein accepts the
descriptive force of public choice theory for some (but not all) statutes, he
rejects the claim that judges should enforce deals.56 A more attractive legal
order will be possible only if judges push statutes in directions that further
broad public purposes rather than interest group preferences.57
50. Pp. 118-22; see also Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NER. L. REV. 431
(1989).
51. Pp. 135-37; see also Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. LJ. 281
(1989).
52. Pp. 130-33.
53. K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 5, at 371-82; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54
(1986); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1415 (tentative ed. 1958); see also R. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COUMrs 287 (1985); Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119 (1932)
(arguing that judicial speculation about how legislature might have resolved a question never presented to
them necessarily involves judicial selection of policy).
54. P. 131.
55. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Tenn-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARv. L. REV. 4,60(1984); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspec-
tive, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
56. See Macey, Promating Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,226-27 (1986) (accepting descriptive force of public choice theory
but concluding that judges should counteract rather than enforce deals).
57. Pp. 137-41; see also Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1017-19 (1989). Sunstein also considers the twin approaches of despair. indeterminacy, which claims that
there is no principled approach to statutory interpretation superior to others because they all fail to provide
reliable answers, and conventionalism, which maintains that interpretive practices can only be practiced in
a community and cannot be articulated or criticized. See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989);
I. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 190-92 (1930); R. Unger, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 104-10
(1975). In response to both, Sunstein maintains that interpreters consciously choose their strategies, and that
choice is in many cases predictable. The fact that the interpretive strategies employ value choices or commu-
nity practices does not mean there is no basis for evaluating different approaches. Pp. 144-47.
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After Sunstein completes his target practice, the only approach left standing
depends on "canons of construction." Canons of construction provide instruc-
tions to courts and others facing recurring difficulties interpreting statutes. He
feels that I destroyed the credibility of canons forty years ago when I mischie-
vously paired canons suggesting one outcome with other canons suggesting the
opposite outcome.58 Although I have discussed these canons in half-jesting
mockery, Sunstein finds them useful as tools to orient readers within a text or
to improve lawmaking and institutional functions.5 9
Sunstein's distinctive contributions to statutory interpretation are, first, to
retrieve statutory canons from the grave I dug for them, and second, to insist
that the choice of canons reflects fundamental regulatory choices and experienc-
es of the last half century. These background norms do not supplant textual and
contextual aspects of the specific statute, but supplement them when they
inevitably produce ambiguity.6"
Sunstein groups his sizeable arsenal of canons into three categories: canons
that further constitutional norms that otherwise go underenforced,61 canons
that counteract the most typical institutional failures of government bodies,62
and canons that counteract the most common failures of regulatory statutes. 63
With regard to the first category, Sunstein urges courts to read statutes in ways
that will promote political deliberation and to construe narrowly interest group
deals. They should limit delegation of authority to agencies and attempt to
heighten the political accountability of regulators. Further, they should insist
on clarity to uphold the rule of law and to give notice to the public; they should
read ambiguous language to protect disadvantaged groups, as well as property
and contract rights; and they should interpret narrowly any statute purporting
to limit rights to hearings or to judicial review. Finally, courts should read
statutes to preserve the relative power of states within the federal system.' 4
An equally large group of canons attempts to respond to the regulatory
problems Sunstein identified earlier. This group includes the suggestions that
courts read statutes to favor diffuse regulatory beneficiaries, coordinate policies
in related areas of regulation, account for technology or social change that has
made a statute obsolete, account for systemic effects of regulation, keep regula-
tory benefits proportional to regulatory costs, and avoid irrationality.65
His long checklist of possible regulatory failures guarantees that the list of
responsive canons will be equally long. Mindful of possible conflict, Sunstein
58. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How










orders them by making those canons which enhance political accountability and
deliberation the two most important, followed next by other constitutionally
inspired canons and those canons calling for proportionality of benefits and
costs.
66
After applying the canons to a series of illustrative cases,67 Sunstein closes
with an observation about the persistence of interpretive techniques that reflect
pre-New Deal understandings of government regulation. Many issues of statuto-
ry construction "amount to a confrontation between regulatory regimes and the
pre-New Deal pre.mises they appear to repudiate." 68 The New Deal attack on
common law private ordering, adopted by the democratic branches, recognizes
that regulation can promote welfare and distributive justice. Such disputes
between past and present are best resolved by synthesizing the best of the prior
constitutional systems within a framework hospitable to modem regulation.
While I realize you remain terribly busy and may not take much interest
in lawyers' squabbles over interpretation, I am quite sure you will have a
response to Sunstein's ideas. His view of regulation, which he distinguishes at
several points from totalitarianism,69 seems to have some bearing on your
long-standing concern with public action and the private sphere.70 It would





Thank you for recommending Sunstein's book. It is indeed an important
and ambitious work, all the more so because it addresses a topic-statutory
interpretation-that has provoked a feeding frenzy among legal scholars today.
I would suggest that Sunstein, like many others writing about interpretation,
seems preoccupied with the number of considerations an interpreter should
consider. Unfortunately, he appears less concerned with who interprets the
statute or with the best method to handle conflicting interpretive considerations.
66. Pp. 186-89.
67. Pp. 194-207.
68. P. 207; see also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (arguing that
Lochner-like use of common law assumptions is still employed in several areas of constitutional law).
69. P. 47; see also pp. 11, 42.
70. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITrcAL THOUGHT
143-71 (1954) [hereinafter PAST AND FUTURE]; H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 323-26
(1966) [hereinafter ORIGINS].
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The current debate over interpretation, like similar debates in the past,
centers on enumerating the considerations an interpreter should include or
exclude. The arresting aspect of the current debate is its linear quality. Most
of the commentators move along a familiar path, beginning with the statute's
language and including more and more considerations as they proceed through
the interpretive enterprise, until they reach a point where they feel it is proper
to exclude a consideration. Those who stop at a given point tend to agree that
everything else further down the path should be excluded. They generally
include the same considerations as other theorists who have reached the same
point on the path. Hence, disagreements all focus on the proper length of the
interpretive path.71 This underlying consensus sets the current debate apart
from earlier discussions about interpretation.
Those who rely on statutory text and structure alone-such as Justice
Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook 72-- make the most ambitious case
for exclusion. They would exclude any evidence of legislative "intent" or
"purpose" because it has no force of law and because it is so easily manipulat-
ed. Instead, they would interpret the statute by looking only to its structure and
to the plain meaning of its words. Current theorists of statutory construction
also put me in this category, although I would dispute this placement.73 Others
concede that the text is relevant, but move beyond the text to formal historical
evidence of the legislature's intent regarding the statute in question. They would
exclude, however, other evidence of legislative preference and the views of
71. This trend in statutory interpretation to include numerous relevant considerations and to argue only
about (1) whether to include certain peripheral considerations and (2) the relevant weight of those consider-
ations, is part of a larger jurisprudential trend favoring "balancing." See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age ofBalancing, 96 YALE .J. 943 (1987); Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance:
The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE LJ. 1 (1987); Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies
of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127 (1984).
72. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construc-
tion, 11 HARV. I.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 64-65 (1988); Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative
History, 1987 DUKE L. 371; see also Eskridge, supra note 47, at 623, 643; Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper:
The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1990) (concluding that textualism is gaining ground in Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation).
73. Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 61; Starr, supra note 72, at 378. In The Theory of Legal Interpreta-
tion, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899) [hereinafter Legal Interpretation], Holmes espoused an "objective"
approach to interpretation that would consider the statutory text and any contemporary evidence (including
statements of legislators) of the common meaning of the statutory language at the time of enactment: 'We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Id. at 419. Holmes had no
objection to using legislative history, but employed it to ascertain the common meaning of statutory language
at the time of enactment, and not because the subjective intent of legislators was binding. See Boston Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (using legislative history to interpret statute); United
States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (resorting to "general purpose" of statutory language to
ascertain its common usage).
Holmes' "objective" view of legislative intent makes his approach a variation on the plain meaning
approach. Thus, he does not fall squarely into the modem linear pattern of interpretation theories, since he
allows courts to look to the statutory language, the history of its passage, and other contemporary evidence,
all the while maintaining the irrelevance of legislative intent as such. See also Holmes, Codes, and the
Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1931) (advice for those drafting and codifying statutes).
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those outside the legislature.74 The next most inclusive step would allow
evidence of the enacting legislature's general purpose in passing the statute, by
identifying the problems facing the legislature when it took action.' Beyond
that, one might derive the legislature's intent or purpose from any source,
including, for example, an historical survey of the era. 6
Further steps along the path of inclusion might encompass the views of
subsequent legislatures. Such views would be determined by looking to statutes
on related topics and other forms of legislative activity.77 One might even use
significant social changes as evidence of the views of subsequent legisla-
tures.78 Each of these approaches would attempt to discover and replicate a
legislative perspective on the statute.
Others would go further to include considerations not even loosely attribut-
able to the legislature, past or present. For example, the interpreter might look
to the views of the agency administering the statute.79 Or, a judge might go
beyond agency views, and decide for herself the desirability of particular
consequences, measured by criteria such as "efficiency," "justice," or "poli-
tics.""0
74. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L REV. 1 (1988) (separation of powers requires courts to look only to legislative intent
and text when interpreting statutes); Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent:
A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L REv.,737 (1985) (criticizing efforts to interpret statutes
using materials other than statutory language and specific legislative history); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and
Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. LJ. 353 (1989).
75. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 87-102 (1975); Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L REV. 1,
14-19 (1957); Macey, supra note 56, at 250-51.
76. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 572-97 (1987); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 53, at 1144-47, 1415. This
approach to statutes is akin to Robert Bork's vision of constitutional interpretation. See R. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5 (1989).
77. See Farber, supra note 51, at 305-18 (post-enactment events may justify interpreter's departure from
statutory text, but changes in public opinion are not sufficient). William Eskridge argues that the Supreme
Court has taken such an approach. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 70-71
(1988). Some interpretive decisionmakers argue that interpreters should promote the overall "coherence"
of the law. This argument might be taken to mean that a statute should be read in light of all other statutory
enactments, so that the interpreter fulfills the "convictions" selected by legislators. See R. DWORKIN, supra
note 53, at 327-30. On the other hand, such a notion of "coherence" may call for a decisionmaker to
promote a more general notion of logical and philosophical coherence.
78. This appears to be the position of William Eskridge, who has argued in a series of law review
articles that interpreters should employ a "dynamic" approach to statutory interpretation, reshaping old
statutes to promote current policy. Eskridge focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on legislative activity as
the measure of current policy. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987);
see also L HURST, DEALING wrrH STATUTES 31-65 (1982); Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 614-19 (1988) (judges look to statutory patterns in collaborative
effort to create policy).
79. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986);
Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 559-61 (1985).
80. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 20-22, 46-54 (judges reformulate statutory purpose to be consistent
with broad prevailing norms); Moore, supra note 47, at 338-58; see also Macey, supra note 57, at 226-27
(interpreter should promote efficiency). Professor Moore's views appear to be an exception to the general
trend of including all sources of legislative intent before arriving at nonlegislative "natural law" consider-
ations. He would consider only the text and the interpreter's views on justice. Moore, supra note 47, at 338-
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Sunstein would allow judges to consider the statutory text, along with
evidence of the enacting or subsequent legislature's intentions or purposes.81
Furthermore, he would draw on regulatory experience to ask whether a particu-
lar interpretation of a statute would accomplish one of the regulatory purposes
or fall prey to a typical regulatory failure. 2 In other words, he asks judges
to save the legislature from itself.
Although he travels a long way down the inclusive path, Sunstein does
exclude some considerations from interpretation. He forbids judges to consider
either purely personal visions of sound policy or perspectives already repudiated
by the democratic branches.8 3 Others have maintained that such an exclusion
is undesirable or impossible.84
Living in a day dominated by common law courts, I never developed fully
my thoughts about statutes, though I did make a few observations."5 It now
occurs to me that Sunstein's decision to include what he does in the interpretive
enterprise is consistent in several respects with my own views on statutes and
the common law process.
Sunstein shares my sense that an interpreter has no choice but to place
statutory language in some larger context in order to ascertain its meaning: "A
word is not a crystal."86 Sunstein also appears to build on my insistence that
law evolves to reflect the needs and values of society as they change over
time.87 An interpreter should handle silence and uncertainty in a way that best
reflects the general outlook of the day, as expressed by the enacting legislature.
In other words, the background for interpreting statutes should evolve just as
statutes evolve. My contemporary, Roscoe Pound, also insisted that interpreters
should use statutes themselves as sources of analogies in interpreting statutory
provisions, rather than drawing on common law doctrine at odds with the
statutory structure.88
58.
81. Pp. 123-33. Although suggesting that Sunstein uses the "linear" model of statutory interpretation,
Holmes does not suggest that Sunstein's approach is internally linear. Sunstein does not require the
interpreter to consider extra-textual materials in any particular order, rather, he suggests that they are all
relevant to the interpreter.
82. Pp. 170-86.
83. P. 142 ("It would be exceptionally presumptuous for courts to invoke laissez-faire principles in
support of [judicial protection of private ordering]. Gaps should not be filled in, and ambiguities should
not be resolved, by reference to values that counter those of the enacting Congress in particular and the
modem regulatory state in general.")
84. Max Radin sald it is inevitable that judges will rely primarily on their subjective preferences. See
Radin, supra note 48, at 882-83.
85. Holmes, Legal Interpretation, supra note 73. See generally B. AcKERMAN, supra note 14, at 6-22
(continued common law focus of Legal Realists).
86. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, I.).
87. 0. W. HOLMEs, COLLEC LEGAL PAPERS 212, 220-21 (1920).
88. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-88 (1908); Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REv. 886 (1930) (calling for use of statutory rather than common
law sources when interpreting statutes). Some might respond that the background for interpretation should
remain stable and not evolve so readily because any departure from the literal terms of the statute awards
one party to the statutory "deal" more than he or she bargained for. Easterbrook, supra note 55, at 14-16;
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Despite my agreement with Sunstein, I recognize some difficult side-effects
of his decision to include so many considerations in the interpretive venture.
Doing so leaves him the devilish task of describing the interaction and relative
importance of the factors. He says that a statutory text will determine many
cases, and that the legislative history will determine many others, 9 yet he also
maintains that a judge in some cases (not just those where text and legislative
history provide no guidance) should take account of regulatory purposes and
failures.90
This indeterminacy in Sunstein's interpretive method raises the same sorts
of problems ,ou highlighted when you exposed the arbitrariness of selecting





Dear Justice Holmes, 92
I agree that the difficulty you noted with Sunstein's interpretive method is
nothing new. If everything counts, one's ability to predict an interpretive
outcome rests on how much a given factor counts. This is precisely the problem
that led me to criticize the canons of construction.
The traditional canons of construction contained a bit of everything. They
instructed courts to fill in the meaning of statutes by following conventions
based on likely legislative desires, or typical uses of language.93 I pointed out
what should have been obvious: the canons often gave conflicting advice, and
the determinative choice among the canons was not compelled by any visible
or logical reason. I am now willing to concede that this criticism was overstat-
ed, since the canons do not conflict in every conceivable case.94 Still, my
proposed response to the difficulty with canons was decidedly understated:
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 533, 539-44 (1983). But the scope of what is covered
by the literal terms of a statute might be narrower than the parties are likely to admit, and it would perhaps
be unreasonable to expect a stable interpretive background for resolving ambiguity. Those negotiating over
language in a statute, if they pay attention to such things, must understand that statutory ambiguity presents
a risk that later interpreters will reject the drafters' view of the disputed language.
89. Pp. 157-59, 231-33.
90. Pp. 133-37.
91. Llewellyn, supra note 58; K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 5, at 371-82, 521-35.
92. For Llewellyn's tribute to Holmes, see K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRAC'ICE 506-19 (1962).
93. Pp. 150-57; W. ESKRDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 76, at 689-95 (1987).
94. Pp. 148-49; Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at24 & n.22 (criticizing Llewellyn's position); Posner, supra
note 50, at 443.
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interpreters should not pretend that canons control outcomes, but should instead
seek an outcome that produces sensible consequences just as a common law
court might.
I have never denied that the right canon, chosen in the right case, could lead
to sound results. Sunstein proposes many appealing canons that could improve
the operation of statutes when interpreters choose and use them wisely. But I
still insist that the canons of my day were not self-selecting and therefore not
self-executing, and neither are Sunstein's; it is all in the selection.
Sunstein provides little direction in choosing the appropriate background
norm. He prioritizes his canons, telling interpreters to rely first on constitutional
norms.95 But this does not offer much guidance, since "accountability" and
"deliberation" are the two overarching constitutional values Sunstein invokes.
Even if one could say what these amorphous values might mean for a given
statute, accountability and deliberation more often than not point in different
directions. Recall that Madison favored national representatives precisely
because they were less immediately accountable to the voters and therefore
more capable of deliberation.96
Sunstein also supplies principles of "harmonization" to resolve potential
conflicts among background norms. For instance, he proposes that a minor
violation of a background norm will give a court only a weak reason to con-
strue a statute in a particular direction.97 However, this principle of harmoniza-
tion is liable to create more uncertainty than it will resolve. It means that even
the clearest prioritizing of norms will settle nothing if the most important norm
is violated the least.
Perhaps Sunstein's most important contribution to the use of canons is his
insistence that some norms are off limits. He argues that interpretive norms
must be consistent with the aspirations and experience of the regulatory state
rather than repudiated policies of private ordering. This broad appeal to consis-
tency might reduce the number of conflicts between norms.98 But given the
bewildering variety of regulatory purposes and failures that Sunstein covers,
conflicts among canons---even those consistent with regulatory experience-will
likely be the rule and not the exception.
Sunstein therefore fails to meet my critique of canons, which focuses on
the choice among canons, however wise each of the individual canons might
be. In the end, Sunstein invokes "practical reason" to explain how a judge will
handle multiple interpretive norms,99 which is similar to my "hopelessly





99. Pp. 186, 210; see also Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 345-54 (1990).
100. Pp. 130-31, 148-49; Ulewellyn, supra note 58.
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practical reason-the conviction that one can know the correct action to take
in a given situation without a theory to explain why it is correct101-- is proba-
bly the closest we come to describing or prescribing a process of statutory
interpretation. Holmes, you outlined long ago the virtues of a pragmatic legal
method that depends primarily on moral intuition as applied to a specific
situation."° I have called this method the "situation sense" of judges. "
Statutory interpretation therefore resembles the vision that you and I share
of the common law method." The common law, at its best, recognizes that
existing legal principles do not compel outcomes; they only serve as a starting
place for extending any given principle to reach the intuitively just outcome
in new cases.105
The very breadth of Sunstein's book may have obscured one of the only
plausible ways of refining the practical reason, or common law, approach to
statutes. For particular statutory sub-areas, such as environmental statutes or
statutes dealing with commercial sales transactions,"° one can imagine that
interpreters could reach a consensus on regulatory purposes and typical failures.
Within the sub-area, interpreters could develop more predictable and desirable
interpretive practices, but these practices would not offer much guidance for
those interpreting statutes outside the sub-area.107
Sunstein is more effective, I think, in answering other Legal Realist criti-
cisms of statutory canons. Max Radin and others criticized canons because the
canons poorly reflected the typical uses of language and the likely intentions
101. See ARIsTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs bk. VI, chs. 5-11 (H. Rackham trans. 1962). The concept
of "practical reason" has proven useful to those with varying perspectives on questions of legal theory and
method. See Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 850, 854-58 (1990) (describing
"feminist practical reasoning" that focuses on "real-life dilemmas posed by human conflict' and focuses
on accounting for "perspectives of the excluded"); Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 827, 838 (1988) (practical reasoning provides method for finding beliefs about matters that cannot
be verified by logic or exact observation). But see Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1534-36 (1985) (use of practical reason concedes legitimacy of too many existing
social conditions).
102. 0. W. HoLiEs, supra note 87, at 200; see also Hantzis, Legal Innovation within the Wider
Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 541, 567-75
(1988); Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 805-15 (1989); Note, Holmes, Peirce
and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE U. 1123, 1124-25, 1137-39 (1975); Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction
Theory of Law and Pragmatism, 39 J. PHIL 85, 92-95 (1942).
103. Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 399, 401.
104. K. LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 5, § 62; Holmes, Legal Interpretation, supra note
73, at 420.
105. K. LLEWELLYN, CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 5, §§ 16, 39, 42.
106. Karl Llewellyn was responsible for the early development of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability and Discretionary Acceleration: of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEx. L. REv. 169, 186-202 (1989); Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,466-72 (1987). Because that statute deals with
a relatively stable group of problems and a relatively homogenous group of persons (merchants), Llewellyn
may have overestimated the value of general advice, such as "reason" and "good sense," to interpreters
of statutes generally.
107. Gewirtz, Editor's Introduction to K. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA xv-xxiii
(1989).
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of a legislature.'08 In other words, these critics directly questioned the canons'
content, rather than their propensity towards inconsistency. Sunstein updates
some canons to make them reflect the experiences and aspirations of the
administrative state. Thus, Sunstein has demonstrated that attention to the
content of interpretive norms can improve interpretation, even where it does
not make the interpretive method more determinate °9 While this may only






I agree with your concluding observation that Sunstein's attention to the
content of canons is a worthwhile effort. But that insight only brings us to more
important questions. Who will develop and use these canons? Sunstein pays
virtually no attention to the process of developing background norms. The
generation of scholars who followed you and Radin---the Legal Process schol-
ars-would find this omission perplexing. Indeed, they might find it distressing
that you still do not turn naturally to the question of institutional competence,
which is, after all, a way to control who will wield the unconstrained power
at work in the law that you have identified.
Legal Process scholars concluded that if substantive principles of law could
not constrain the outcome of a decision, perhaps it was more important to focus
on the institutional pressures on the decisionmaker than on the arguments he
or she would hear."0 To that end, they developed more fully my position that
108. Radin, supra note 47, at 873-75; de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88
U. PA. L. REV. 527, 536-44 (1940); Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 966-67 (1940).
109. Llewellyn observes that it is unrealistic to expect a legal method to determine legal outcomes with
predictability and certainty, yet maintains certainty as a desirable end of legal analysis. For an argument
that certainty of outcome is overvalued as an end of the legal system, see Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 465,470-73,535-41 (1988). For thoughtful efforts to point out the strengths of an indetermi-
nate interpretive method, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 99, at 345-54; Eskridge, GadamerlStatutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 679 (1990) (criticizing fetish regarding interpretive method); Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 837-58 (1988) (describing practical reason approach
to legal tasks, including interpretation).
110. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
16-23 (1962) (effort to describe implications ofjudiciary's "countermajoritarian difficulty"); see Amar, Law
Story, 102 HARV. L REV. 688, 689-710 (1989) (describing Legal Process School); Peller, NeutralPrinciples
in the 1950"s, 21 U. MIcH. I.L. REFORM. 561, 586-99 (1988) (same); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial
Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 239-40 (1983) (distinguishing original
Legal Process School from later developments).
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judges should leave decisions about certain types of issues to others who are
more directly accountable."' Legal Process scholars might join me in asking
why Sunstein pins his hopes for developing and using proper background norms
on judges rather than other interpreters.1
Sunstein's interpretive model deviates from mine when he says that a judge
must minimize the impact of legislative folly. Sunstein contrasts this position
to one I have expressed elsewhere: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell
I will help them. It's my job."113
In many cases, this difference in our approaches might not change the
outcomes. I would not assert that judges must enhance the perverse side-effects
of a statute if Congress did not contemplate such side-effects. If there is a
reading of a statute that a reasonable person would likely adopt to avoid foolish
consequences, I might be willing to attribute that reading to the legislature."'
But I would only do so where it is quite likely that the enacting legislature
would want me to do so.' Sunstein seems to allow the judge to draw more
generally on regulatory experience, even to contradict certain legislative choices.
Judges must interpret statutes using something more than the explicit
instructions of Congress, but they must do so with a keen sense of their limited
legitimacy and limited abilities.'16 The difficulty of judicial legitimacy, a
product of the unaccountability of judges, is a familiar topic and I need not
review it with you." 7 Allow me to focus instead on limited judicial abilities,
111. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) (Holmes, I., dissenting); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 190-92 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75-76 (1905) (Holmes,
I., dissenting).
112. Cf. Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L. 1591 (1988).
113. P. 113 (quoting 1 HoIIMs-LAsKi LaTTERs 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953)).
114. 'The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has
intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed.... [lit is not an adequate
discharge of duty for courts to say 'We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore
we shall go on as before."' Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 1259, 1263-64 (1947) (quoting Holmes).
115. See Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (metaphor of judge as field commander receiving garbled
instructions from commanders); Maltz, supra note 74, at 9-13; Horack, supra note 53, at 126-27.
116. Sunstein briefly deals with the possibility that judges, because of the undemocratic nature of their
office, should rely on legislative judgments as much as possible. Pp. 133-37. He submits, however, that this
will only be possible in the small group of cases in which judges can ascertain what the legislature wanted
by using noncontroversial interpretive principles. In other cases, he says, the interpreter will need to select
proper interpretive principles to reach sound results. Sunstein's answer points to the advantages of some
interpreter resorting to considerations beyond legislative purpose and intent, but he provides an inadequate
reason to choose courts as the primary interpreters.
117. Justice Holmes is perhaps wise to emphasize judicial abilities rather than judicial legitimacy, since
there are several factors that argue for the legitimacy of certain "value" choices by judges. To begin with,
legislatures are less democratically accountable than is generally acknowledged. Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1080-87 (1988). In
addition, the sharp distinction between "reasoned" exercises of judgment and exercises of political "will"
is perhaps philosophically and psychologically naive. Popkin, supra note 78, at 546-52.
Sunstein mitigates the legitimacy problem in a couple of ways. First, his prescription for political
deliberation and accountability mimics the "process" approach of John Hart Ely, who suggested that judicial
review should aim to improve the democratic character of the political process. This is particularly true for
Sunstein where judges are employing the constitutionally based background norms. Pp. 165-66; J. ELY,
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which present even greater problems for Sunstein's reliance on judges as
interpreters.
For Sunstein, it is critical that the interpreter develop and use a set of
background norms based on a sophisticated general view of regulation. But the
very diversity of adjudication makes it unlikely that judges will develop such
a coherent general view. Judges will hear arguments by advocates regarding
a particular application of a particular statute; an overarching vision of regula-
tion is unlikely to emerge from the fray. Even if this were a possibility for one
judge, there are over one thousand federal judges (appointed by different
Presidents) and thousands of state judges interpreting regulatory statutes;118
the chances that such a group would develop a set of norms resembling
Sunstein's are remote in the extreme.
Moreover, Sunstein calls on interpreters to be alert to the systemic conse-
quences of different forms of regulation and to anticipate hidden problems that
escaped the attention of the legislature." 9 Yet an inability to see all the di-
verse effects of a decision, to look beyond the frame of the controversy that
presents itself, is perhaps the greatest weakness of a judicial decision. 2°
Sunstein may be appealing to the interpreters who are least able to see the
subtle side-effects of regulation.
If Sunstein had looked to administrative agencies rather than courts, these
troubles would have tapered off. To begin with, an agency answers to elected
officials and can avoid some of the difficulties of judicial legitimacy. It can
make the "value-laden" choice"2 of an interpretive norm without such serious
questions concerning its authority to do so.122
An agency could also choose a single set of interpretive norms without the
conflicts that would inevitably develop as diverse courts confront the issue. Its
perspective on the operation of an entire regulatory program, rather than on one
focused, disputed area at the moment, makes the agency better able to anticipate
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75, 102-03 (1981). Second, Sunstein's call for a"sympathetic engagement"
with regulatory principles by courts grows out of the need to respect the decisions of the most democratic
branches. Pp. 71-73.
118. See 1990 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY 533-49; THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1990-91 EDITION 204-
07 (1990).
119. Pp. 170-86.
120. See S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 103-12,
129-35 (1983) (judicial review of EPA focuses on limited set of concerns and distorts agency priorities);
Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
257, 262-63 (1987) (limited focus ofjudicial review of agency rulemaking makes review unpredictable and
forces NHTSA to abandon rulemaking).
121. P. 190.
122. The legitimacy of agency policymaking is grounded both in the delegation of policymaking power
from the legislature and in the indirect electoral accountability of administrators through the chief executive.
Both sources of policymaking legitimacy for agencies axe problematic, since (I) there must be some
indication that Congress actually chose to give authority to the agency, and (2) the executive's legitimate
role is limited to administration and not legislating. Nevertheless, agencies have a claim to policymaking
legitimacy that is marginally stronger than the claim of judges. First, it is fair to guess that Congress
authorizes agency policymaking more frequently than judicial policymaking. Second, the tasks of adminis-
tration inevitably encompass some policy decisions.
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side-effects that others may have missed.la And the agency's sustained atten-
tion to its regulatory mission will give it the best grasp of pertinent regulatory
purposes and the history of past failures. At the same time, it would be familiar
with concrete applications of the statute, just as a court would."2' In short,
Sunstein has created a powerful model for improving agency interpretation of
statutes that employs traditional agency strengths. The trouble lies in the fact
that he addresses it first to courts.
While Sunstein recognizes that agencies also interpret statutes,"z he be-
lieves they should do so in the shadow of courts. He rejects any general
preference for agency interpretation over judicial, and consigns agency interpre-
tation to the realm of "mixed questions" of law and fact.126 This leaves most
issues to the courts, since the "pure" questions of law they decide will include
the choice of appropriate background norms.
Sunstein's preference for courts over agencies is largely a response to the
problem of agency capture by private interests. This is a genuine concern and
makes the choice of interpretive institutions all the more difficult. Yet it is not
clear how often agency "capture" actually occurs, or actually disables agency
interpretations of statutes. 12 7 By contrast, the limited perspective judges have
seems far more commonplace.
Agencies are not the only alternative to courts as the place for generating
interpretive norms. Sunstein also should acknowledge the legislature as a source
of interpretive norms. Perhaps Sunstein's set of "canons" might take the shape
of an "interpretation statute" of the sort found in the United States Code and
many state codes. 118 In such.a construction statute, the legislature decides for
itself the approach that interpreters should take in fleshing out the meaning of
regulatory statutes. While the construction statute will itself require some
judicial or agency interpretation,'29 it would nevertheless further the process
of developing a set of background norms congenial to the regulatory state.
123. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984).
124. Sunstein lists this as a significant interpretive advantage of courts: "Above all, the focus on the
particular circumstances enables judges to deal with applications that any legislature, no matter how far-
sighted, could not conceivably have envisaged .... In this respect, judicial decision of individual cases,
allowing an emphasis on the particular context, contains significant advantages for interpretation." Pp. 135-
36.
125. Pp. 161-62, 191-92.
126. Pp. 142-44.
127. See generally I. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY
Do IT 90-110, 158-71 (1989) (detailing agency behavior difficult to explain using capture model); S.
KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMRICAN GOVERNMENT 231-70 (1987).
128. For some representative construction statutes, see 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1988); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
9603 (West 1980) (referring to interpretation instructions for each code); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3 (1986);
TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 1988).
129. See, e.g., Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 207, 216 (1917); West, Adjudica-
tion is not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-as-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV.
203, 253-57 (1987).
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Sunstein is certainly not alone in his court-centered approach to interpreta-
tion. With few exceptions, general discussions of interpretation spotlight judges.
Most theorists have not considered why judges, as opposed to agencies, should
remain at the center of analysis and debate.130 But given the satisfying fit
between Sunstein's approach and agency talents, this book may present an





Your correspondence with Justice Holmes has stimulated my thinking about
Professor Sunstein's views on regulation. You and Justice Holmes, being
lawyers, seem terribly concerned with which institutions have interpretive
decisionmaking authority, and which method they employ to reach their deci-
sions. However, these methodological and institutional analyses of the interpre-
tive process are pointless if the statutes involved begin with an improper view
of regulation and the place of government.
While I find many of Sunstein's views on regulation appealing, I believe
his book offers a dangerously incomplete statement of when and how it is
appropriate for government to regulate human affairs. While it explains the
incredible variety of benefits that citizens might hope for when they regulate,
it offers a uni-dimensional account of the dangers of regulation, focusing only
on the danger of economic inefficiency. The book does not explore other
dangers to freedom and consequently does not develop ways to guard against
them.
As I have emphasized in my writing, the best government is one that
preserves a public space for freedom.'13 As in the Greek polis, we must create
conditions for citizens to make new beginnings and inspire others to action
through their words and deeds. 32 A government succeeds where it makes
room for such freedom; it fails where it eliminates freedom and moves toward
130. Of course, administrative law scholars routinely consider the interpretive abilities of agencies and
courts. See, e.g., Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. LJ. 1 (1985). Silence
on the question of agency interpreters is more common among those who consider statutory interpretation
more generally. One notable exception to this silence regarding agency interpreters is Wlliam Eskridge,
who argues that the prospect of agency "capture" justifies a preference for judicial interpretation. Eskridge,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275 (1988).
131. See, e.g., H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 51-58 (1958).
132. Id. at 192-99; H. ARENDT, PAST AND FUTURE, supra note 70, at 71 (1961) (Greek emphasis on
public sphere for "famous deeds").
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totalitarianism, as in Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union."' Although
Sunstein himself several times raises the possibility that his vision of regulation
might ultimately lead to totalitarianism,1" he offers no adequate way to pre-
vent such an outcome.
Sunstein's vision of regulation, however, does have two features I admire
greatly. First, Sunstein is right to reject the minimalist state. As I have stated
before, freedom of action is only possible where citizens participate together
in a political order.13 A society that merely prevents its members from injur-
ing one another does little to promote the human condition. Indeed, the threat
of totalitarianism does not arise merely from destructive collective action; it
also arises where there is no forum for the exercise of collective freedom.131
The alienation of individuals who do not act together as a plurality paves the
way for totalitarianism. Secondly, Sunstein makes an admirable effort to distin-
guish citizens from market actors. He acknowledges that people may have
certain aspirations for themselves or their society, even though they may fail
to act on those aspirations when behaving as consumers. He claims that his
view of regulation encompasses several different visions of the political or-
der,137 including those that emphasize freedom:
[T]he freedom of collectivities or communities [is] embodied in deci-
sions, reached by the citizenry as a whole, about what courses to pursue.
This view is closely associated with traditional republicanism, but it has
resonances in Madisonian thought as well. On this view, political
autonomy can be found in collective self-determination, as citizens
decide, not what they "want," but instead who they are-what their
values are and what those values require.'38
I couldn't have said it better myself.
Sunstein makes the distinction between citizens and market actors to
establish the possibility of "deliberative" government, where outcomes are not
necessarily determined by the economic needs of individuals. Rather, delibera-
tive government is independent of preexisting economic interests, and citizens
can persuade one another to take principled action regardless of their usual
behavior as consumers.
133. H. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 70, at 389-459; S. WHITFIELD, INTO THE DARK: HANNAH
ARENDT AND TOTALITARIANISM 25-52 (1980).
134. Pp. 11, 42, 47; see also Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1129, 1136, 1170-71.
135. H. ARENDT, THE LIF OF THE MIND: WILLING 201 (1978); H. ARENDT, supra note 131, at 176-77
(1958).
136. H. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 70, at 267-69, 308-18; see also Sandel, Morality and the Liberal
Ideal, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 15 (totalitarianism possible under conditions of alienation).
137. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1132-36.
138. P. 35. This passage bears a striking resemblance to some of Arendt's work, where she claimed
that political participation reveals "who" citizens are rather than "what" they are. H. ARENDT, supra note
131, at 179.
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The distinction Sunstein makes between citizens and consumers, together
with his portrayal of deliberative government, coincides with my vision of a
"public space" for freedom. I share his high opinion of the American Revolu-
tion, which brought the people together for discussion and action in a forum
where economic interests did not predominate."9
While Sunstein affirms the possibility of a public space transcending private
interests, pointing out a possibility is not enough to ensure freedom. He offers
no assurance that representatives will protect free political action within the
regulatory context. Indeed, he rejects several promising means of promoting
and preserving freedom that I have proposed elsewhere.
First, Sunstein refuses to exclude economic issues from the public forum.
While I recognize that my position runs counter to most modem political
theory,"1 ' I have asserted that we should exclude economic considerations
from the realm of action,14t because citizens have no freedom to act indepen-
dent of their economic interests. 42 Their need for food and other necessities
forces them to engage in certain predictable behavior, and perhaps to use
coercion and violence to obtain what they need.143 There is no place in the
political realm for the predictable or for coercion and violence.'" Thus, citi-
zens must meet their economic needs before they engage in politics." On
this score, I believe Justice Holmes would side with me against Sunstein.
Holmes maintained privately that ownership of property was a destructive issue
whenever it arose in politics."
Despite the danger to freedom that I perceive in public resolution of eco-
nomic issues, Sunstein places such economic matters at the center of the
regulatory stage. The majority of the regulatory purposes he discusses involve
the maximization of social wealth or the distribution of wealth. He shares with
Marx and the modern Western political tradition an insistence that economics
should be the focal point of public action.
139. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 153-56 (1963); Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 35-48.
140. G. TLABA, POLITICS AND FREEDOM: HUMAN WILL AND ACTION IN THE THOUGHT OF HANNAH
ARENDT 69-94 (1987).
141. H. ARENDT, supra note 131, at 79-174.
142. See Parekh, Hannah Arendt's Critique of Marx, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOVERY OF THE
PUBLIC WORLD 67 (M. Hill ed. 1979); see also Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 38 (1990).
143. H. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 70, at 152-53 (imperialist policy an outgrowth of appeal to
economic interest); H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 120-34
(1963).
144. H. ARENDT, On Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 103 (1969); H. ARENDT, supra note 139,
at 10.
145. H. ARENDT, supra note 131, at 58-67.
146. THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 45,56 (1. Peabody ed. 1964); PROGRESSIVE MASKS 47-48 (D.
Burton ed. 1982) (Holmes states in a letter that the public "habitually confuses consumption with owner-
ship-and thinks that when it has found that the title to a large part of the property in the U.S. is in a few
individuals it has discovered an economic grievance"). By contrast, CLS scholars maintain that any attempt
to insulate property ownership from public debate involves coercion and controversy. See M. TUSHNET,
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-17 (1988).
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We would, in my opinion, be safer from totalitarianism if we were to
exclude economic matters from the public realm altogether. 47 Alternatively,
we might tolerate economic regulation, but maintain the primacy of non-
economic issues and the inviolability of public space for discussion.14
Sunstein, however, does not explore this alternative.
Another preventative measure that Sunstein neglects, and one more in
keeping with modern politics than the measures I have just mentioned, is
participation. By participating directly in politics, citizens strengthen bonds with
one another and exercise the freedom that is the antithesis of totalitarian-
ism. 149 Direct citizen participation was a recurrent element of the republican
influence in the nation's founding. 5 Sunstein, however, is unenthusiastic
about participation. He asserts that direct participation in government is unwork-
able, and therefore turns to representative government.15' While calling for
greater government accountability to voters, he also praises representation
because of its insulation from the desires of citizens. Sunstein, though sympa-
thetic with some aspects of republicanism, settles on a truncated version of this
tradition.
I have stated that voting is not an adequate form of participation, because
the value of political power comes not from its possession but from its regular
exercise.152 If Sunstein could devote more effort to creating possibilities for
direct citizen participation in the affairs of government, there might be reason
to believe that the citizens would use forms of regulation that carry out collec-
tive aspirations, a possibility Sunstein only raises. The isolation and alienation
that can bring on totalitarianism might not take hold.
Perhaps my reservations about Sunstein's regulatory theory are related to
your criticism of his account of interpretation. He generates a flurry of conflict-
ing rationales for regulation, just as he offers competing methods of interpreta-
tion. In both cases, he sidesteps the most challenging question, how to mediate
between these seemingly incongruent rationales and methods of interpretation.
In sum, Sunstein offers many possible activities for government, but does
not address the twin dangers I have discussed: on the one hand, citizens could
fail to engage in public activities and forfeit the realm for political action, while
on the other hand, regulatory activities might themselves destroy freedom. We
need more than a description of possible regulatory purposes. We need some
147. H. ARENDT, supra note 131, at 248-326; see Thompson, Constitutional Theory and Political
Action, 31 1. POLMCS 655, 657-59 (1969); Jay, Hannah Arendt: Opposing Views, 45 PARTISAN REv. 348,
352-53 (Oct. 1978).
148. G. TLABA, supra note 140, at 90-92.
149. H. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 70, at 323-26; H. ARENDT, supra note 139, at 23942, 256-59
(exploring tension between representation and direct participation in public affairs).
150. G. WOOD, THE CREAnON OF THE AiiERIcAN REPuBuc, 1776-1787, at 222-26 (1969); 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 73, 110-11 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
151. Pp. 14-15; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 8, at 39.
152. H. ARENDT, supra note 139, at 170; G. KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT: POLITICS, CONScIENcE, EVIL
124-32 (1984).
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careful thought about when these purposes provide too little or too much
regulatory activity to be consistent with freedom.
Sunstein does begin the related task of finding the best means to a given
end. His reasons not to regulate all address the possible inefficiency of regula-
tion as a tool to maximize social wealth. This effort to improve means is
important, but it cannot replace the need to choose proper regulatory ends,
which will prevent destructive regulation. Our efforts should focus on encourag-






Thank you for passing along your iconoclastic views regarding Sunstein's
account of regulation. While you may be right to hope for politics transcending
economic interests, it is unlikely that economics will remain outside the political
realm in the United States. As you recognize, free political action is not
possible if one is preoccupied with feeding oneself. Many citizens therefore face
a paradox: they must remain preoccupied with necessity until the polity is
reorganized. That can only happen through politics, so they bring issues of
necessity into the public forum.)53
Assuming this is true, it raises another critique of Sunstein's account of
regulation. You argued that he dwells unnecessarily on economic regulation
without acknowledging its destructive effects apart from wealth maximization
and distribution. But it is worth asking whether Sunstein's regulatory principles
will offer any real guidance to those who are concerned only with such eco-
nomic issues. Will he overwhelm them with possibilities?
The sheer number of potential forms of regulation makes it difficult to apply
Sunstein's regulatory principles, just as I noted in my letter to Holmes that it
is difficult to apply his interpretive principles. As Sunstein puts it, "[t]he
appropriate nature and scope of regulation cannot be decided on without
knowing a good deal about the facts, including above all the practical effects
of various regulatory strategies.""l Sunstein's approach to regulation simply
underscores the importance of further study of specific forms of regulation, in
an effort to learn "a great deal about the facts." A regulator choosing appropri-
153. See Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power, 44 SOCIAL RESEARCH 3




ate regulatory ends and means from Sunstein's catalogue must look to the facts





I enclose copies of some correspondence between myself, 0. W. Holmes,
Jr., and Hannah Arendt, all discussing your recent book, After the Rights
Revolution. You addressed certain comments to us throughout the book, so I
thought you might be interested to see our replies. While our reactions are at
times critical, that should not obscure our admiration for your book. Our
criticisms focus primarily not on what you have done, but on what you have
left undone. Holmes and I criticize what we believe to be an incomplete
interpretive method; Arendt criticizes what is missing concerning an appropriate
vision of freedom. Nevertheless, you are still young, with time and skill enough
to complete the task you have set for yourself. We eagerly await your future
work. Take good care of my chair.
Sincerely yours,
Karl N. Llewellyn
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